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The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace1University of Iowa, Iowa City Iowa, USA
University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky, USA, daniel-morey{at}uky.edu International competition occurs in many different forms. Just as a state would be in danger if it allowed its opponent to gain a military advantage, one that falls behind a rival in an economic contest similarly faces risks. States must weigh the trade-offs between economic and military growth, as well as deciding on the best strategy to follow should war erupt. We use a formal, dynamic model to explicitly capture the trade-offs that states face in their search for security and dominance. The deductions from the model demonstrate that by considering the long-run results of a peacetime rivalry, weaker states might conclude that their only hope of winning or surviving a rivalry lies in fighting a counterforce war, explain why and how stalemates evolve during counterforce wars, and indicate that targeting industrial objectives shortens the duration of wars.
Key Words: competition • dynamic model • strategy • trade-offs • war
Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, No. 2,
152-170 (2008) This article has been cited by other articles:
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